"Private hendelser"

Forseminaret 2017
3. og 4. mai

Atferd vil være en funksjon av hendelser i miljøet og noen deler av dette miljøet er innenfor huden hos et individ - private hendelser. Disse hendelsene er relatert til atferd på en helt spesiell måte ettersom tilgjengeligheten til disse hendelsene er begrenset for andre. Private hendelser har vært diskutert innen atferdsanalyse over en lang periode, men spesielt i løpet av de siste 20 årene. Et søk i PsycInfo sin database 22.1.2017 med søkordene atferdsanalyse og private hendelser ga 65 treff, mens søkeordene behaviorisme og private hendelser ga 80 treff. Studier av private hendelser har vært spesielt viktig for de som studere kompleks menneskelig atferd (Tourinho, 2006). Private hendelser har vært fokus både innen klinisk rettet arbeid (e.g., Taylor & O'Reilly, 1997; Wilson & Hayes, 2000) og begrepsmessige avklaringer etter Skinner (1945) som for eksempel i publikasjoner av Moore (1980, 2009). Enkelte forskere har også stilt spørsmålet om private hendelser bør være en del av en vitenskap om menneskelig atferd eller ikke (e.g., Anderson, Hawkins, Freeman, & Scotti, 2000) og har svart klart ja på dette spørsmålet. Temaet er ulikt behandlet innenfor for eksempel metodologisk og radikal behaviorisme.


Presentasjonene på forseminaret vil belyse flere sider ved private hendelser. Valget av temaet for seminaret er viktig av flere grunner og som Moore har påpekt vil en økt forståelse av private hendelser gi ''... better services for clients and a better overall theoretical understanding of the human condition''(2000, s. 45)


Programmet

Forseminaret starter onsdag ettermiddag kl. 15:30, og avsluttes kl. 13:00 på torsdag. Spesielt inviterte forelesere fra inn- og utland vil belyse ulike aspekter ved private hendelser, og det hele rundes av med en paneldebatt på torsdagen.


Forelesning på forseminar

The Role of "Private Events" in a Natural Science of Behavior

Mitch Fryling California State University

Kategori: Konseptuell/teoretisk atferdsanalyse

Sammendrag: This presentation considers B. F. Skinner’s notion of private events in the science of behavior. In doing so the aims of natural sciences are described, especially the careful derivation of scientific constructs from contacts with events. Moreover, both dualism and reductionism are considered, underscoring the many ways in which both harm the aims and progress of natural sciences. It is argued that notions of “private events” fall short of our natural science aims in behavior analysis, and prevent progress in important areas. An alternative conceptualization of “private events” is described, whereby private events are considered wholly observable, public phenomena and available for scientific investigation. The implications of adopting this alternative for the science of behavior are discussed.


Forelesning på forseminar

Why private events are not a retreat to mentalism

Øystein Vogt Høgskolen i Oslo og Akershus

Kategori: Konseptuell/teoretisk atferdsanalyse

Sammendrag: Private events are stimuli and behavior that are subject to privileged introspective observation at least with typical current experimental technology. These include behavior such as thinking, feeling, remembering and perceiving, and stimuli in the form of bodily sensations that are not traceable to relatively immediate antecedents in the external environment. Critics both outside and within behavior analysis view private events with skepticism, specifically as a retreat to mentalistic explanation. It is argued that this stems from a failure to recognize the different, respective causal categorical frameworks mental and private events are theorized within. Mental (or neurocognitive) events are hypothetical mediating processes between stimuli input and behavioral output as part of a proximate causal account within a mechanistic framework. Private events are part of an ultimate causal account of learning within a contextual, historical framework. The description of private events is directly derived from the concepts describing experimental control of observable behavior. Claims to their actual general existence is supported by the limited role afforded to introspection as a mode of observation in radical behaviorism. Introspection is unfit to reliably measure single instances of private events, but is very much fit to confirm the existence of private events as a general phenomenon. Rejecting the latter proposition constitutes an obscure skepticism that is unsuitable as a philosophy of behavioral science.


Forelesning på forseminar

What is radical in radical behaviorism? A private plunge in historical events

Tore Vignes Fylkesmannen i Rogaland

Kategori: Konseptuell/teoretisk atferdsanalyse

Sammendrag: Some instances of behavior are private or covert, meaning they are accessible to only the behaving person, and a naturalistic science of behavior has to use the same terms and concepts as behavior accessible for others. Skinner’s discussion of the distinction between radical and methodological behaviorism focuses on privately observable behavior. Radical behaviorism does not distinguish between observational and theoretical terms in the same way as traditional psychology, and there is no need for the ghost in the machine used by methodological behaviorists. In both experimental and applied behavior analysis, private events should be important, but why and when has so many lost their way? Don’t expect the question to be completely answered during this presentation.


Forelesning på forseminar

Private and Hypothetical Variables in the Study of Mediation in Paired Associate Learning and Possible Lessons for Current Research on Emergent Behavior

Christoffer Eilifsen Høgskolen i Oslo og Akershus

Kategori: Konseptuell/teoretisk atferdsanalyse

Sammendrag: Since it’s conception as a science, experimental psychology has tried to provide a satisfying account of emergent behavior in humans. The study of mediated generalization using paired associate methodology was once a highly active field of research exploring this issue. The research tradition was theoretically diverse, and a variation of covert behaviors and constructs was evoked to account for experimental data. Today, published papers within this tradition are rare. Research on mediated generalization and modern stimulus equivalence research have some similarities, but important differences exist. Some authors have suggested that theoretical conceptions of stimulus equivalence that include private behavior may lead stimulus equivalence research to suffer the same fate as mediated generalization. Within this context, the current paper will explore the role of private events in the understanding of complex human behavior and the difference between the conception of private events in methodological and radical behaviorism.


Forelesning på forseminar

On differences between mentalistic explanations and private events as causes of behavior

Børge Holden Sykehuset innlandet HF

Kategori: Konseptuell/teoretisk atferdsanalyse

Sammendrag: Behavior analysts have frequently criticized psychological explanations of others for being mentalistic, dualistic, circular and meaningless. But what is mentalism, is mentalism always dualistic, and can apparently mentalistic explanations be less mentalistic and circular than we have commonly argued? Are there more similarities between “traditional” and behavior analytic explanations than frequently thought? For example, behavior analysts, too, explain behavior by way of “events inside of us”. In other words, I will try to “normalize the relationship between behavior analytic and more traditional explanations somewhat.