About the relevance of an indeterminist perspective on a science of behaviour

Not rarely, we find in manuals and psychology textbooks criticisms of behavioural theories. They are considered simplistic, artificial, and too limited to develop a comprehension of intentional, cognitive and complex aspects of psychological phenomena. In this work, I defend the thesis that these difficulties derive from the determinist position typically taken by radical behaviourists. Still hostage to a dichotomous perspective and commitments to realism and causal thinking, behaviour analysis ends up not developing the notion of behaviour as a subject matter in its own right but defending problematic physicalist and realistic positions. Alternatively, I argue for the possibility and relevance of an indeterminist perspective, in order to reach the open, dynamic and ambiguous character of the notion of behaviour. Illustrating this movement, I point out changes in the Skinnerian system, following the conceptual requirements of the selectionist model. Based on these discussions, I argue that an indeterminist perspective enables, not interdicts, the development of a science of behaviour.